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SEARCHING EVERYWHERE FOR A SECTION 
24(1)(A) STANDARD: CITY OF ASHEVILLE, 
TOWN OF BOONE, AND THE UNCLEAR 
FUTURE OF LOCAL-STATE RELATIONS IN 
NORTH CAROLINA* 
INTRODUCTION 
Every state in the Union sets up its own framework for relations 
between the state and local governments. Most states broadly 
delegate “authority over local matters” to local governments in their 
state constitution or a single state statute.1 North Carolina is one of 
only two states that does not take this approach.2 The North Carolina 
Constitution, though, does limit the circumstances under which the 
General Assembly can pass “local acts,” which alter the powers of 
one or a small subset of local governments.3 Two recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina—City of Asheville v. State4 and 
Town of Boone v. State5—considered this constitutional limitation 




 *  © 2018 Jeffrey D. Miles. 
 1. Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Local Governments Need Home Rule?, 84 
N.C. L. REV. 1983, 1989 (2006). 
 2. Id.; see also infra notes 9–15 and accompanying text. 
 3. See N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24. Though there is “no exact rule or formula” for 
determining whether a law is “local” or “general,” the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
has generally classified local laws as those that “discriminate[] between different localities 
without any real, proper, or reasonable basis or necessity.” City of Asheville v. State, 369 
N.C. 80, 90–91, 794 S.E.2d 759, 768 (2016) (quoting McIntyre v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510, 
517–18, 119 S.E.2d 888, 893–94 (1961)). For more on this issue, see generally Frayda 
Bluestein, Local Acts and General Laws: Another Look, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. 
GOV’T L. (Sept. 12, 2012), https://canons.sog.unc.edu/local-acts-and-general-laws-another-
look/ [https://perma.cc/8AGA-2SLY] [hereinafter Bluestein, Local Acts and General 
Laws] (discussing when general state law displaces local law) and Frayda Bluestein, What 
is a Local Act?, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (Apr. 6, 2010), 
https://canons.sog.unc.edu/what-is-a-local-act/ [https://perma.cc/DDT3-WK6D] [hereinafter 
Bluestein, What is a Local Act?] (defining local acts and explaining how they interact with 
other laws). 
 4. 369 N.C. 80, 794 S.E.2d 759 (2016). 
 5. 369 N.C. 126, 794 S.E.2d 710 (2016). 
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Though these two cases involved the same state constitutional 
provisions—article II, section 24 and article VII, section 1—and were 
decided on the same day, the court sided with local authority in one 
and with state authority in the other. In City of Asheville, the court 
found for Asheville in a dispute between the city and the General 
Assembly over ownership of the city’s water system.6 In Town of 
Boone, the court approved of—over the town’s objection—a change 
the legislature made limiting Boone’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.7 
The methodologies the court used to reach these seemingly opposing 
conclusions are strikingly similar. In both cases, it reviewed the 
history behind, plain language of, relationship between, and 
precedent related to the constitutional provisions at issue but 
ultimately came to opposite conclusions after these parallel analyses.8 
This Recent Development explores why the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina reached seemingly divergent conclusions in these two 
cases on similar issues. It explains how article VII, section 1—which 
gives the General Assembly broad authority over local 
governments—and article II, section 24—which limits how the 
General Assembly can legislate about local governments—relate to 
each other and argues that the majority erred in Town of Boone by 
failing to find that article II, section 24 applied to the law at issue in 
that case. It further details why the concurring justices in Town of 
Boone misapplied the section 24(1)(a) test articulated in City of 
Asheville by failing to properly account for the purpose of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and Boone’s specific exercise of it. It 
suggests that the “material connection” test announced by the City of 
Asheville court could prove to be a workable solution to the court’s 
confused jurisprudence on state-local relations, provided that the test 
is modified to ensure that subject matters historically regulated by the 
General Assembly are safe from constitutional challenge. 
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the background 
law, including the framework the state constitution provides for local-
state relations and the related jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina. Part II briefly summarizes the facts, reasoning, and 
holdings of City of Asheville and Town of Boone and explains how 
these decisions can be reconciled. Part III argues that article II, 
section 24 should apply to the law at issue in Town of Boone and that 
a proper section 24(1)(a) analysis should render the law 
 
 6. City of Asheville, 369 N.C. at 81, 794 S.E.2d at 762. 
 7. Town of Boone, 369 N.C. at 127, 794 S.E.2d at 712. 
 8. See City of Asheville, 369 N.C. at 102–03, 794 S.E.2d at 775–76; Town of Boone, 
369 N.C. at 132–34, 794 S.E.2d at 715–16. 
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unconstitutional. Part IV suggests that, taken together, City of 
Asheville and Town of Boone demonstrate the need to reform section 
24(1)(a) doctrine and proposes a potential solution to remedy the 
problem. 
I.  THE LEGAL BACKDROP 
Under the Federal Constitution, local governments have no 
inherent authority or right to exist.9 They are purely creations of the 
various state governments, and their authority derives from the state 
government that created them.10 Unlike most other states, North 
Carolina does not grant broad authority over local matters to local 
governments through its state constitution or a single state statute.11 
Instead, North Carolina local governments derive their authority 
from a “patchwork of local and general laws.”12 These laws include 
“numerous general statutes” laying out the general powers of all local 
governments and local acts that apply only to a given municipality or 
set of municipalities.13 In some cases, the charter establishing a 
particular local government provides that government with additional 
authority.14 There is thus little doubt that the power of local 
governments is expressly limited; the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina has described local governments “as creatures of the State, 
 
 9. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907). 
 10. See City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 549 (1905); 
see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure 
of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990). 
 11. See Bluestein, supra note 1, at 1989. The approach most other states take is 
commonly referred to as the “home rule” approach. Id. at 1989–90. 
 12. Bluestein, Local Acts and General Laws, supra note 3. 
 13. Frayda Bluestein, Local Government Authority: Piecing It Together, COATES’ 
CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (Feb. 8, 2012), https://canons.sog.unc.edu/local-government-
authority-piecing-it-together/ [https://perma.cc/SS9J-ECLD]. 
 14. Id. General laws from the General Assembly’s last session include a law setting a 
uniform system of development fees for local water and sewer authorities, Act of June 29, 
2017, ch. 138, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 996 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 130A, 153A, 160A, 162A (2017)), and a statewide ban on local 
governments imposing stormwater fees levied on runways and taxiways on airports. Act of 
June 28, 2017, ch. 132, secs. 1–2, §§ 153A-277(a1), 160A-314(a1), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 
131, 131–32 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-277(a1), 160A-314(a1) (2017)) (banning 
stormwater fees imposed by counties and cities). Local laws passed during the General 
Assembly’s last session included a prohibition on firing a bow and arrow from roads and 
rights-of-way in Richmond County alone, Act of June 29, 2017, ch. 77, 2017 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 506, 506, and a special dispensation allowing the city of Wilson to operate a 
municipal broadband system, Act of July 25, 2017, ch. 180, sec. 1, § 160A-340.2(c)(3), 2017 
N.C. Sess. Laws 421, 421 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-340.2(c)(3) (2017)). 
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[which] can exercise only that power which the legislature has 
conferred upon them.”15 
A. The Constitutional Framework 
Two somewhat contradictory provisions of the North Carolina 
Constitution govern the General Assembly’s authority over local 
governments. Article VII, section 1 gives the General Assembly the 
authority to “provide for the organization and government and the 
fixing of boundaries of” local governments.16 It also allows the 
legislature to give local governments “such powers and duties . . . as it 
may deem advisable” except as otherwise limited by the 
constitution.17 Though this provision has been infrequently 
considered by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, a 1968 
commission studying state constitutional changes noted that article 
VII, section 1 is “not a delegation of power . . . but . . . merely a 
recognition of [the legislature’s] power in this regard” and “a general 
description of the General Assembly’s” authority in this area.18 
Article II, section 24 is one of the limitations contemplated by 
article VII, section 1. It prohibits the General Assembly from 
enacting “any local, private, or special act or resolution” that falls into 
one or more of fourteen categories.19 First among the categories of 
prohibited bills are those “[r]elating to health, sanitation, and the 
abatement of nuisances.”20 As if to reiterate its ultimate purpose, 
section 24 later notes: “[a]ny local, private, or special act or resolution 
enacted in violation of the provisions of this Section shall be void.”21 
What is now article II, section 24 first became part of the North 
Carolina Constitution by amendment in 1917.22 Its predecessor 
provision, article II, section 29, was proposed primarily “to relieve the 
legislature of the burden of local bills.”23 This burden can hardly be 
overstated; on average, more than seventy-five percent of the bills the 
General Assembly passed in the years leading up to the amendment’s 
 
 15. Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 417, 451 S.E.2d 284, 287 (1994). 
 16. N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 17. Id. 
 18. N.C. STATE CONSTITUTION STUDY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NORTH 
CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION 33 (1968). 
 19. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24. 
 20. Id. § 24(1)(a). 
 21. Id. § 24(3). Section 24 also prevents local, private, or special acts “[r]elating to 
ferries or bridges; . . . [r]elating to non-navigable streams; . . . [and r]egulating labor, trade, 
mining, or manufacturing,” among other categories. Id. § 24(1). 
 22. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 29; see also Joseph S. Ferrell, Local Legislation in 
the North Carolina General Assembly, 45 N.C. L. REV. 340, 340 (1967). 
 23. Ferrell, supra note 22, at 358. 
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adoption were local or private.24 Pamphlets promoting the 
amendment’s passage and minutes of the 1913 commission studying 
proposed constitutional changes clearly support this primary purpose 
of relieving this legislative burden, and the pamphlets further reveal a 
secondary purpose: strengthening local self-government.25 
The two provisions are contradictory in that the state supreme 
court has often read article VII, section 1 as giving the General 
Assembly essentially unlimited authority over local governments,26 
while the text of article II, section 24 specifically limits the way that 
the General Assembly can supervise the authority of local 
governments. If the subject of the General Assembly’s action 
concerns health and sanitation or any of the other thirteen listed 
categories, section 24’s text seems to clearly indicate that the General 
Assembly may only act when it makes a law that affects all local 
governments and may not act when that law affects only one or a few 
governments. Though section 24 might be understood as only a 
limitation on the way the General Assembly exercises its “unlimited” 
authority with respect to local governments, there is at least a conflict 
between the limitations imposed by section 24 and the view, 
frequently expressed by the state supreme court, that article VII, 
section 1 gives the General Assembly plenary authority over local 
governments. 
B. The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s Section 24(1)(a) 
Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s article II, section 24 
jurisprudence has been “long . . . marked by a lack of consistency” 
 
 24. Id. at 352. The term “private act” is not well defined. Id. at 344–45 n.22. One 
leading treatise defines private acts as “those which apply by name or specific 
identification to particular persons or groups of persons in regard to their 
private interests.” 2 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 43:2 (7th ed. 2009). “Special” acts on the prohibited 
subjects are also unconstitutional under section 24. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24. The term 
“special act” is not well defined either but appears to be a synonym for a local or private 
act. See SINGER & SINGER, supra, at § 40:1 (describing special acts in terms similar to 
which the Supreme Court of North Carolina has described local acts). 
 25. Ferrell, supra note 22, at 352–53, 358–60; see also Williams v. Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of N.C., 357 N.C. 170, 186–88, 581 S.E.2d 415, 426–28 (2003) (explaining that the 
“history of the promulgation of Article II, Section 24 reveals” that the provision’s purpose 
was to limit the “plethora of local, private, and special enactments” then being passed by 
the General Assembly). 
 26. See, e.g., Town of Boone v. State, 369 N.C. 126, 131, 794 S.E.2d 710, 714–15 (2016) 
(emphasizing the General Assembly’s “plenary power to create political subdivisions of 
local government, establish their jurisdictional boundaries, and invest them with certain 
powers” and referencing article VII, section 1 as support). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1882 (2018) 
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with “years of conflicting decisions and multiple standards.”27 In the 
fifteen cases before City of Asheville and Town of Boone in which the 
court considered whether a local act violated section 24, it took an 
array of approaches to apply the section.28 Though the purpose of the 
local law at issue tends to be the focus of the court’s analysis,29 the 
level of connection required between section 24’s prohibited purposes 
and the local law before the law is struck down has varied,30 as has the 
specific way the court has examined the law’s purpose.31 In several 
cases, the court articulated no reasoning at all for finding that a law 
related to health and sanitation.32 
Despite the state supreme court’s varied approaches, the 
outcomes of section 24(1)(a) cases has been remarkably consistent. 
Since 1917—when section 24 first became part of the constitution—
the court “has rejected a claim that a local law impermissibly ‘related 
to’ health and sanitation” only three times.33 Since 1930, the court has 
 
 27. Frayda Bluestein, Local Acts Relating to Health and Sanitation: Supreme Court 
Weighs in on Asheville and Boone Cases, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (Jan. 5, 
2017), https://canons.sog.unc.edu/local-acts-relating-health-sanitation-supreme-court-weighs-
asheville-boone-cases/ [https://perma.cc/VF3U-MUZQ]. The analysis of cases in this area 
presented in this Recent Development will be relatively brief. For an excellent, detailed 
overview of the court’s article II, section 24 (formerly article II, section 29) cases between 
1917 and 1966, see generally Ferrell, supra note 22, at 360–402. 
 28. Ferrell, supra note 22, at 361, 378, 390 (describing the court’s section 24 
jurisprudence as varying between eras of “strict construction,” “reappraisal,” and “broad 
construction”). 
 29. See, e.g., City of New Bern v. New Bern-Craven Cty. Bd. of Educ., 338 N.C. 430, 
440, 450 S.E.2d 735, 741 (1994) (“[B]oth the legislature’s directions for the creation of the 
Code and the Building Code Council’s stated purposes for the different inspections under 
the Code evince an intent to protect the health of the general public.” (emphasis added)); 
State ex rel. Carringer v. Alverson, 254 N.C. 204, 207, 118 S.E.2d. 408, 410 (1961) (“There 
can be little doubt but that the ‘Housing Authority Law’ relates to health and 
sanitation. [It] declares the purpose to be the removal of conditions which ‘cause an 
increase in and spread of disease and crime and constitute a menace to health, safety, 
morals and welfare of the citizens.’” (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-2 
(1959))); Armstrong v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 185 N.C. 405, 409, 117 S.E. 388, 390 (1923) 
(“[T]he purpose [of the local act] itself is in direct contravention of the amendment.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 30. Compare Idol v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 733, 65 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1951) (noting a 
relationship “clear beyond peradventure”), with Sams v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Madison 
Cty., 217 N.C. 284, 285, 7 S.E.2d 540, 541 (1940) (finding an “apparent” relationship). 
 31. Compare City of New Bern, 338 N.C. at 440, 450 S.E.2d at 741 (focusing on “the 
legislature’s directions for the creation of the” law at issue), with Chadwick v. Salter, 254 
N.C. 389, 398, 119 S.E.2d 158, 164 (1961) (examining the purpose of the law in the light 
most favorable to the defendants). 
 32. See Town of Kenilworth v. Hyder, 197 N.C. 85, 89, 147 S.E. 736, 738 (1929); 
Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N.C. 722, 727–28, 143 S.E. 530, 532–33 (1928). 
 33. City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 103 n.16, 794 S.E.2d 759, 776 n.16 (2016). 
The City of Asheville court mentions two of these cases, Reed v. Howerton Eng’g Co., 188 
N.C. 39, 123 S.E. 479 (1924), and Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1882 (2018) 
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rejected such a claim only once.34 The court has found laws creating a 
housing authority,35 shifting responsibility for the enforcement of 
building codes,36 authorizing a sheriff to remove and destroy cattle,37 
consolidating public health agencies,38 providing for water and sewer 
services,39 governing the selection of local health officers,40 and 
directing the support of hospitals41 to all relate to health, sanitation, 
or the abatement of nuisances, thus making them unconstitutional 
under section 24. 
Interestingly, two of the three cases where the court upheld the 
local law at issue and determined that it was not related to heath, 
sanitation, or nuisances concerned water and sewer regulations.42 
Since these cases are both from the 1920s—an era when the court 
generally disfavored section 24 and declined to enforce it43—they can 
largely be dismissed as lacking precedential value. The third and only 
modern case—Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc. v. City of 
Greensboro44—was somewhat unique. It considered the General 
Assembly’s mandate that a law of statewide applicability regarding 
 
324 N.C. 499, 380 S.E.2d 107 (1989). Id. It fails to mention Town of Kenilworth, where the 
court upheld against a constitutional challenge a local act that “ratified” the Buncombe 
County Commissioners’ creation of a water and sewer district. Town of Kenilworth, 197 
N.C. at 86–87, 147 S.E. at 736. 
 34. Of the three cases described in the previous note, Reed dates from 1924 and Town 
of Kenilworth from 1929. Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc., decided in 1989, is the only 
modern case. Even that case is nearly thirty years old, meaning that it was decided in a 
time when the General Assembly’s local acts agenda was less politically controversial and 
more stable. See infra note 141–42 and accompanying text. 
 35. State ex rel. Carringer v. Alverson, 254 N.C. 204, 207, 118 S.E.2d. 408, 410 (1961). 
 36. City of New Bern, 338 N.C. at 440, 450 S.E.2d at 741. 
 37. Chadwick v. Salter, 254 N.C. 389, 398, 119 S.E.2d 158, 164 (1961). 
 38. Idol v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 733, 65 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1951). 
 39. Lamb v. Bd. of Educ. of Randolph Cty., 235 N.C. 377, 379, 70 S.E.2d 201, 203 
(1952); Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N.C. 722, 727, 143 S.E. 530, 532–33 (1928). 
 40. Sams v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Madison Cty., 217 N.C. 284, 285, 7 S.E.2d 540, 541 
(1940). 
 41. Bd. of Managers of James Walker Mem’l Hosp. of Wilmington v. City of 
Wilmington, 237 N.C. 179, 189, 74 S.E.2d 749, 757 (1953). 
 42. See Town of Kenilworth v. Hyder, 197 N.C. 85, 89, 147 S.E. 736, 738 (1929); Reed 
v. Howerton Eng’g Co., 188 N.C. 39, 44, 123 S.E. 479, 481 (1924). 
 43. See Ferrell, supra note 22, at 361 (“Initially, the court was openly antagonistic to 
claims that the 1917 amendments [including what is now section 24(1)(a)] significantly 
restricted legislative power over the structure and powers of local government.”); see also 
City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 103 n.16, 794 S.E.2d 759, 776 n.16 (2016) (noting 
the court’s tendency to accept claims that “local law[s] impermissibly ‘relate[] to’ health 
and sanitation”). In reaffirming the court’s view that the provision of water and sewer 
service relates to health and sanitation, City of Asheville itself demonstrates the limited 
precedential value of Town of Kenilworth and Reed. 
 44. 324 N.C. 499, 380 S.E.2d 107 (1989). 
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solid waste in cities be applied to an area annexed by Greensboro.45 
Though ostensibly the court held that solid waste was not a subject 
related to health, sanitation, and nuisances, it focused more on the 
General Assembly’s authority to ensure a statewide law was enforced 
in Greensboro than on the connection between the law at issue and 
the prohibited purposes of section 24(1)(a).46 
Though the two provisions are clearly in conflict, the court has 
never held that article VII, section 1 somehow displaces article II, 
section 24. In cases considering both provisions, the court has 
traditionally been so unconcerned with a conflict between the two 
provisions that it neglected to discuss the issue at length.47 Instead, 
the court has described article II, section 24 as “the fundamental law 
of the State” that “may not be ignored.”48 
II.  THE CASES THEMSELVES: CITY OF ASHEVILLE AND TOWN OF 
BOONE 
During its 2013–14 session, the General Assembly passed a law 
transferring the City of Asheville’s municipal water system to a new 
countywide authority, and another that eliminated the Town of 
Boone’s extraterritorial jurisdiction—which had allowed Boone to 
exercise some of its municipal powers outside of its boundaries. 
Asheville and Boone challenged these laws, and the resulting 
challenges ultimately reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
in City of Asheville and Town of Boone. 
 
 45. Id. at 505, 380 S.E.2d at 111. 
 46. See id. at 505, 380 S.E.2d at 110–11. 
 47. See City of New Bern v. New Bern-Craven Cty. Bd. of Educ., 338 N.C. 430, 438–
42, 450 S.E.2d 735, 740–42 (1994); Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc., 324 N.C. at 503–06, 380 
S.E.2d at 110–11; see also Town of Boone v. State, 369 N.C. 126, 158, 794 S.E.2d 710, 731 
(2016) (Ervin, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he fact that we reached the merits of 
the . . . claim under Article II, Section 24 [in Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc.] suggests that 
a local act that alters local government jurisdictional boundaries and reorganizes units of 
local government is not immune from challenge under Article II, Section 24.”). The 
number of section 24 cases that do not even mention article VII, section 1 supports this 
proposition as well; of the court’s fifteen section 24 cases before City of Asheville and 
Town of Boone, only City of New Bern and Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc. discuss article 
VII, section 1. See, e.g., Gaskill v. Costlow, 270 N.C. 686, 687–90, 155 S.E.2d 148, 148–151 
(1967) (striking down a local law directing the Town of Beaufort to provide water and 
sewer service in annexed areas on article II grounds without mentioning article VII). 
 48. High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 264 N.C. 650, 656, 142 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1965). 
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A. City of Asheville and the Unconstitutionality of Local Acts 
Relating to Water and Sewer 
In May 2013, the General Assembly passed House Bill 488 (the 
“Asheville Act”), which “effectively required the City of Asheville to 
involuntarily transfer [its] public water system to a newly created 
metropolitan water and sewerage district.”49 Though the bill was 
styled in broad terms—not as one that directly affected Asheville 
alone50—the way it was crafted ensured Asheville was “the only 
entity that [would] ever be required to” make such a transfer.51 
Asheville challenged the law as, inter alia, a violation of article 
II, section 24, arguing that it was a local act related to health and 
sanitation.52 The Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed the 
trial court’s ruling for the city in favor of the State.53 The city 
appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which reversed the 
court of appeals and found that the Asheville Act was an 
unconstitutional violation of article II, section 24.54 
After finding that the Asheville Act was a local law for purposes 
of section 24,55 Justice Ervin—writing for the majority—described 
the court’s interpretation of section 24 since 1925 as “broad.”56 The 
court articulated a new test for determining whether a law violates 
section 24(1)(a), namely “whether, in light of its stated purpose and 
practical effect, the legislation has a material . . . connection to issues 
involving health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances.”57 
 
 49. City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 81, 794 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2016); accord Act 
of May 16, 2013, ch. 50, § 1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 118, 118–19 (mandating the transfer of 
the water system). 
 50. See Act of May 16, 2013, § 1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 118–19; see also City of 
Asheville, 369 N.C. at 115 n.9, 794 S.E.2d at 783 n.29 (Newby, J., dissenting). 
 51. City of Asheville, 369 N.C. at 94, 794 S.E.2d at 770. 
 52. Id. at 83–84, 794 S.E.2d at 764. 
 53. Id. at 81, 794 S.E.2d at 762. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 98, 794 S.E.2d at 773. As noted above, what makes a law passed by the 
General Assembly “local” as opposed to “general” cannot be reduced to an “exact rule or 
formula.” See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Though the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina has used a number of tests over time to make this determination, City of 
Asheville, 369 N.C. at 90–92, 794 S.E.2d at 768–69, here it focused on the General 
Assembly’s intent to single out Asheville’s water system for special treatment “absen[t] 
any justification.” Id. at 95, 794 S.E.2d at 771. In other words, since the General Assembly 
did not articulate a rational reason for treating Asheville differently from other 
municipalities, and since the law was drafted “to ensure that the involuntary transfer 
provisions of the legislation did not apply to any municipality except” Asheville, the law 
was classified as local rather than general. Id. 
 56. See City of Asheville, 369 N.C. at 103, 794 S.E.2d at 776. 
 57. Id. 
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According to the court, if such a material connection exists, the law 
relates to health and sanitation for purposes of section 24 and is thus 
unconstitutional.58 The court emphasized that only a “material 
connection” between the prohibited purposes in section 24 and the 
contested legislation is required; the prohibited purpose does not 
have to be the “exclusive or predominant” purpose of the local act at 
issue.59 
Applying that test to the Asheville Act, the court found that the 
stated purpose of the legislation indicated a “material connection” 
between the reason for its enactment and issues involving public 
health and sanitation.60 Describing the “stated purpose of the 
legislation [as] ‘provid[ing] reliable, cost-effective, high-quality water 
and sewer services,’” and citing a past case that categorized water 
regulations as health regulations, the court had “no hesitation in 
concluding that the [Asheville Act] impermissibly relate[d] to health 
and sanitation.”61 The court found this connection was further 
bolstered by the practical effect of the legislation, since in defining 
who was responsible for providing water service, the Asheville Act 
also determined who would be responsible for complying with state 
public health regulations related to water and sewer services.62 
The court concluded its opinion by addressing the apparent 
contradiction to section 24 posed by article VII, section 1. It noted 
that article II, section 24 “is the fundamental law of the State and may 
not be ignored,”63 even though article VII, section 1 “gives the 
General Assembly exceedingly broad authority over the ‘powers and 
duties’ delegated to local governments.”64 In other words, the court 
recognized that while the General Assembly’s article VII authority is 
“exceedingly broad[,] . . . that authority is subject to limitations 
imposed by other constitutional provisions.”65 
Justice Newby, joined by Chief Justice Martin, dissented. Justice 
Newby focused on the “plenary authority” he believes article VII, 
section 1 gives to the General Assembly to provide for the 
organization of local government and argued that an article II, section 
24 analysis is only required when a “power” or “duty” of a local 
 
 58. See id. at 104, 794 S.E.2d at 776–77. 
 59. See id. at 103, 794 S.E.2d at 776. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (quoting Act of May 16, 2013, ch. 50, pmbl., 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 118, 118). 
 62. Id. at 104, 794 S.E.2d at 776–77. 
 63. Id. at 106, 794 S.E.2d at 778 (quoting High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 264 
N.C. 650, 656, 142 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1965)). 
 64. Id. at 105, 794 S.E.2d at 777 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1). 
 65. Id., 794 S.E.2d at 777–78. 
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government is involved.66 Finding that the Asheville Act involved 
neither a power nor a duty,67 he reasoned that a section 24 analysis 
was not necessary and argued that the law was clearly constitutional.68 
B. A Focus on Boundary Fixing Leads to a Finding of 
Constitutionality in Town of Boone 
In 2014, the General Assembly withdrew Boone’s authority to 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction (“ETJ”) by passing Senate Bill 
865 (the “Boone Act”),69 which Boone challenged as facially 
unconstitutional under article II, section 24.70 ETJ allows a local 
government to exercise some, though not all, of its given powers 
outside its physical boundaries.71 A three-judge panel of superior 
court judges granted summary judgment for Boone.72 The State 
appealed directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which 
reversed.73 
Using much of the same reasoning from his dissent in City of 
Asheville, Justice Newby’s opinion for the court emphasized the 
General Assembly’s “plenary power to create political subdivisions of 
local government, establish their jurisdictional boundaries, and invest 
them with certain powers.”74 The court held that a plain reading of 
article VII, section 1’s text reveals that only the second clause—which 
relates to the General Assembly’s authority to assign “powers and 
duties” to local governments—contains a limitation.75 In contrast, the 
 
 66. Id. at 111, 794 S.E.2d at 781 (Newby, J., dissenting). The idea is that section 24 is 
triggered only when an act of the General Assembly alters the substantive authority of a 
local government. See id. at 111 n.3, 794 S.E.2d at 781 n.23. So, section 24 would apply to 
an act of the General Assembly limiting the ability of a local water and sewer authority to 
construct new pipes but would not apply to the General Assembly’s adjustment of that 
same authority’s service area. See id. 
 67. Id. at 114–15, 794 S.E.2d at 783. 
 68. Id. at 111–12, 794 S.E.2d at 781–82. 
 69. Act of June 26, 2014, ch. 33, § 1, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 139, 139–40; Town of Boone 
v. State, 369 N.C. 126, 129, 794 S.E.2d 710, 713 (2016). 
 70. Town of Boone, 369 N.C. at 129, 794 S.E.2d at 713. 
 71. DAVID W. OWENS, LAND USE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA 29–30 (2d ed. 2011). 
 72. Town of Boone, 369 N.C. at 130, 794 S.E.2d at 713. The trial-level panel’s concise 
two-page decision did not provide any reasoning to support its finding. See Town of Boone 
v. State, No. 14 CVS 13934, 2015 WL 9941790, at *1–2 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 29, 2015). 
 73. Town of Boone, 369 N.C. at 127, 794 S.E.2d at 712. 
 74. Id. at 131, 794 S.E.2d at 714. 
 75. Id. at 134, 794 S.E.2d at 716 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1). The full provision 
reads: 
The General Assembly shall provide for the organization and government and the 
fixing of boundaries of counties, cities and towns, and other governmental 
subdivisions, and, except as otherwise prohibited by this Constitution, may give 
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first clause, which allows the legislature to “provide for the 
organization and government and the fixing of boundaries of” local 
governments, gives the General Assembly essentially unfettered 
power in that area.76 
Since the Boone Act “retract[ed] the Town’s jurisdictional reach 
to its corporate limits,” the court found that it was exactly the type of 
action “contemplated by the first clause of article VII, section 1.”77 
The idea underlying the court’s opinion is that altering Boone’s 
authority is essentially the same as changing its geographic 
boundaries.78 This sort of activity, in the majority’s view, is only about 
where a municipality can exercise its authority, not about what kind of 
authority a municipality has.79 Since the text of article VII, section 1 
can be read as giving the General Assembly unlimited authority over 
the “fixing of boundaries” and as only limiting the legislature’s 
authority in assigning local governments “powers and duties,” the 
majority concluded that the General Assembly’s power to enact the 
Boone Act was essentially unlimited and that article II, section 24 did 
not apply.80 
Three justices disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that 
section 24 does not apply to the Boone Act. In their concurrence, 
Justices Ervin and Hudson said that they would have found that, 
though section 24 applies to the Boone Act, the law ultimately passes 
a section 24 analysis and is therefore constitutional.81 
In the view of Justices Ervin and Hudson, ETJ authority is more 
about a municipality’s ability to use certain powers than it is about 
boundary fixing.82 Working from that premise, Justice Ervin—writing 
for them both—argued that even if ETJ “implicates the ‘organization 
and government’ of units of local government as authorized by 
Article VII,” past precedent of the court clearly brings laws “changing 
 
such powers and duties to counties, cities and towns, and other governmental 
subdivisions as it may deem advisable. 
N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 76. See Town of Boone, 369 N.C. at 132, 134, 794 S.E.2d at 715−16 (quoting N.C. 
CONST. art. VII, § 1). 
 77. Id. at 136, 794 S.E.2d at 718 (referencing N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 136–37, 794 S.E.2d at 718. 
 81. Id. at 137, 167, 794 S.E.2d at 718, 737 (Ervin, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 82. Id. at 152–54, 794 S.E.2d at 728–29. The general idea of this argument is that ETJ 
authority allows a municipality to exercise only a limited set of powers outside its 
corporate limits. Boundary fixing, in contrast, defines the area where a municipality may 
exercise all of its powers. See id. 
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the existing assignment of regulatory authority among units of local 
government” within the purview of section 24.83 This argument, he 
contended, is supported by the general principle of constitutional 
construction that courts should seek to “harmonize” conflicting state 
constitutional provisions so as to “render every word operative.”84 
Applying the test outlined in City of Asheville to the Boone Act, 
Justice Ervin found that “the vast majority” of ETJ regulations did 
not implicate heath, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances, while 
conceding that some of those regulations did.85 In his view, then, 
when looking at the practical effect of the entire Boone Act “in light 
of the presumption of constitutionality,” the Boone Act does not have 
a material connection to health, sanitation, or the abatement of 
nuisances.86 
Justice Beasley, in contrast, argued that the Boone Act failed a 
section 24 analysis.87 She analogized the Boone Act to the laws at 
issue in past section 24 cases and argued that the “practical effect of 
removing” Boone’s ETJ authority was that it could no longer enforce 
“ordinances that relate to health and sanitation” and others that 
“relate to non-navigable streams.”88 Justice Beasley argued that the 
court “should not analyze each of the . . . subjects [prohibited by 
section 24] in isolation.”89 Since nearly all of the authority withdrawn 
from Boone implicates health, sanitation, abatement of nuisances, or 
non-navigable streams, she saw a “clear[] . . . material connection” 
between the Boone Act and those subjects and would hold the law 
unconstitutional.90 
 
 83. Id. at 154–55, 794 S.E.2d at 729 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1). 
 84. Id. at 156–58, 794 S.E.2d at 730–31 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE 
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER 
OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 92 (7th ed. 1903)). 
 85. Id. at 163, 794 S.E.2d at 735. The scope of powers that can be exercised through 
ETJ authority is varied. Though ETJ authority in North Carolina is referenced infra Part 
III.B, for a more detailed treatment of ETJ, see generally OWENS, supra note 71, at 29–36; 
DAVID W. OWENS, UNC SCH. OF GOV’T, THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE WITH 
MUNICIPAL EXTRATERRITORIAL PLANNING JURISDICTION 8–13 (2006), 
http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/ss20.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5NU-TD2H]. 
 86. See Town of Boone, 369 N.C. at 166–67, 794 S.E.2d at 737. 
 87. Id. at 167, 794 S.E.2d at 737 (Beasley, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 174–75, 794 S.E.2d at 742. Local acts “[r]elating to non-navigable streams” 
are also prohibited by section 24. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24(1)(e). In two lengthy footnotes, 
Justice Beasley quoted directly from the concurring opinion to illustrate the array of 
regulations related to health, sanitation, abatement of nuisances, and non-navigable 
streams that Boone lost the ability to enforce in the ETJ area as a result of the Boone Act. 
See Town of Boone, 369 N.C. at 175–76 nn.4–5, 794 S.E.2d at 742–43 nn.29–30. 
 89. Id. at 176, 794 S.E.2d at 743. 
 90. Id. at 176–77, 794 S.E.2d at 743. 
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C. Reconciling the Two Decisions 
Perhaps the most obvious difference between City of Asheville 
and Town of Boone is the difference between the factual situations 
involved. The type of regulation at issue in each case was different,91 
as was the action the General Assembly took to achieve the policy 
change.92 These factual differences certainly played some role in the 
different outcomes of these two cases. The facts of Town of Boone 
seem—at least at first glance—to more closely align with the 
language of the first clause of article VII, section 1 because the Boone 
Act “fix[ed] the boundaries” of Boone’s authority by limiting Boone’s 
ETJ authority. Thus, the court seems to give some extra weight to the 
fact that the General Assembly was, at least in some sense, adjusting 
Boone’s physical boundaries by altering its ETJ authority. City of 
Asheville also considered water and sewer regulations, which the 
court had considered in section 24 cases several times before.93 
However, it is difficult to fully attribute the different outcomes in 
these cases to these factual distinctions. Using the Town of Boone 
court’s logic, City of Asheville seemingly fits equally well into article 
VII, section 1’s language because the law at issue involved the 
“organization and government” of the water and sewer system in 
Buncombe County (both in terms of setting up the new type of 
government and limiting Asheville’s authority) and “fix[ed] the 
boundaries” of a newly created type of local government.94 In other 
words, there is not much of a practical difference between the 
General Assembly’s action in the Asheville Act and its action in the 
Boone Act. When it fixes the boundaries of local government (what 
the Town of Boone court says the Boone Act did), the General 
Assembly is necessarily assigning “powers and duties” to different 
governments (what the Town of Boone court implies the Asheville 
Act did). 
 The fact that municipalities can use their ETJ authority to 
enforce zoning regulations and ordinances related to “erosion and 
 
 91. Compare City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 81, 794 S.E.2d 759, 762 (2016) 
(considering water and sewer regulations), with Town of Boone, 369 N.C. at 129, 794 
S.E.2d at 713 (considering extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
 92. Compare City of Asheville, 369 N.C. at 115 n.9, 794 S.E.2d at 783 n.29 (Newby, J., 
dissenting) (describing the Asheville Act as a facially-general law), with Town of Boone, 
369 N.C. at 129, 794 S.E.2d at 713 (noting the Boone Act only affected Boone). 
 93. See, e.g., Lamb v. Bd. of Educ. of Randolph Cty., 235 N.C. 377, 379, 70 S.E.2d 201, 
203 (1952); Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N.C. 722, 727, 143 S.E. 530, 532–33 (1928). 
 94. See N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“The General Assembly shall provide for the 
organization and government and the fixing of boundaries of counties, cities and towns, 
and other governmental subdivisions . . . .”). 
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sedimentation control” and “floodways” bolsters this lack of practical 
difference.95 In fact, Boone’s exercise of this type of authority 
motivated the Boone Act.96 So, though the Town of Boone court 
focused on the boundary-setting aspect of the withdrawal of Boone’s 
ETJ authority, it had practical implications for the “powers and 
duties” assigned to Boone as well. In sum, by creating a new type of 
local government (the “metropolitan water and sewerage district”) 
and setting the geographical boundaries of the district’s authority,97 it 
could be argued that the Asheville Act falls exclusively under article 
VII, section 1, as the Town of Boone court held that the Boone Act 
did.  
Since the factual backdrop of the two cases alone cannot explain 
the difference in outcomes, it must be explained at least in part by the 
way the court understood article VII, section 1 and article II, section 
24 in the broader constitutional context. The court, however, largely 
used the same methodologies to understand this broader context. 
Specifically, it reviewed the history behind, plain language of, 
relationship between, and precedent related to both article VII, 
section 1 and article II, section 24 in both cases.98 The difference in 
outcomes must therefore lie in the court’s application of these 
methodologies. 
The different ways that the City of Asheville and Town of Boone 
majorities applied general principles of constitutional construction are 
significant because these differences allowed the court to reach 
seemingly opposite conclusions in similar cases on the same day. This 
is not obvious by looking at the text of each opinion at a glance. Both 
opinions seem to consider one constitutional provision at the expense 
of another. The City of Asheville majority took the court’s historic 
approach, which assumes that section 24 always applies without fully 
explaining why.99 The Town of Boone majority mentioned both 
 
 95. OWENS, supra note 71, at 31. 
 96. See infra text accompanying notes 114–16. 
 97. See City of Asheville, 369 N.C. at 93–94, 794 S.E.2d at 770 (noting that the effect of 
the Asheville Act was to transfer the City of Asheville’s water system to a county-wide 
authority for all of Buncombe County). 
 98. See id. at 102–03, 794 S.E.2d at 775–76; Town of Boone v. State, 369 N.C. 126, 
132–34, 794 S.E.2d 710, 715–16 (2016). 
 99. The City of Asheville majority begins its section 24 analysis by describing the 
provision as “the fundamental law of the State . . . [that] may not be ignored.” City of 
Asheville, 369 N.C. at 88, 794 S.E.2d at 767 (quoting High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 
264 N.C. 650, 656, 142 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1965)). The court does not reference article VII, 
section 1 until the penultimate paragraph of its opinion, and even then, it largely 
dismisses the arguments of the State and Justice Newby’s dissent out-of-hand with little 
discussion. See id. at 105–06, 794 S.E.2d at 777–78; see also supra notes 47–48 and 
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article VII, section 1 and article II, section 24 fairly frequently, but 
ultimately reasoned that the latter provision did not apply.100 
Justice Ervin’s concurrence in Town of Boone highlights the key 
difference between the two cases. He points out that the Boone 
majority “unduly enlarges the scope of” article VII, section 1 and 
“unduly narrows . . . the reach of the limitations on the scope of the 
legislative power set out in Article II, Section 24.”101 This argument 
showcases the central difference between the two cases. City of 
Asheville more closely follows the canon of construction that 
constitutional provisions should be harmonized, read together, and 
construed to give maximum effect to all provisions. It explicitly 
recognized the General Assembly’s very broad article VII authority 
over local governments, while also recognizing that such authority is 
limited by article II.102 Town of Boone, in contrast, values the 
meaning of one constitutional provision at the expense of another. 
This difference in interpretation—and not the factual differences—is 
the true distinction between the two cases that allowed the court to 
reconcile them. 
III.  WHY ARTICLE II, SECTION 24 SHOULD APPLY TO AND 
INVALIDATE THE BOONE ACT 
As suggested by Justice Ervin in Town of Boone, the canons of 
constitutional construction necessitate a section 24 analysis in cases 
involving the constitutionality of a local act promulgated by the 
General Assembly. This Part further explains why section 24 should 
apply in Town of Boone and demonstrates why the Boone Act fails a 
careful section 24(1)(a) analysis. 
A. Why Section 24 Should Apply to the Boone Act 
As a general matter, the state constitution is a limit on—rather 
than a grant of—power.103 When interpreting a constitutional 
provision, a “fundamental principle” is that the interpretation “give 
 
accompanying text (discussing the court’s historical lack of concern about conflicts 
between article II, section 24 and article VII, section 1). 
 100. See Town of Boone, 369 N.C. at 127, 794 S.E.2d at 712 (finding that article II, 
section 24 did not apply to the Boone Act because it simply fixed the boundaries of the 
Town of Boone). 
 101. Id. at 147, 794 S.E.2d at 724–25 (Ervin, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 102. City of Asheville, 369 N.C. at 105–06, 794 S.E.2d at 777–78. 
 103. Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 338, 410 S.E.2d 887, 891 (1991); see also N.C. 
STATE CONSTITUTION STUDY COMM’N, supra note 18, at 1 (“[W]hat may appear in form 
to be a grant of authority to the General Assembly to act on a particular matter normally 
is in legal effect a limitation.”). 
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effect to the intent of the framers [of the provision] and of the people 
adopting it.”104 The goal in interpreting the state constitution is to 
“harmonize” and give effect to all its provisions.105 Additionally, when 
interpreting conflicting general and specific statutes on the same 
subject, North Carolina courts err on the side of the specific statute, 
especially when the specific provision was adopted later than the 
general one.106 Principles of statutory interpretation apply to 
constitutional interpretation.107 
Applying section 24 to every constitutional case concerning a 
local act—as the concurring and dissenting opinions in Town of 
Boone suggested—adheres to the general idea that the constitution is 
a limit on power since it limits the way in which the General 
Assembly can exercise state power. It also gives effect to the original 
meaning of section 24 and the broader constitution of 1971 because it 
helps keep the General Assembly out of an array of local matters 
with which it should not be concerned. In the same way, a policy of 
strongly enforcing section 24 harmonizes article II with article VII 
because such a policy gives full meaning to both provisions. When 
enforced in such a way, section 24 does not limit the General 
Assembly’s actual authority, but simply limits the way that otherwise 
unlimited authority to control local governments may be authorized. 
 
 104. In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 162, 250 S.E.2d 890, 920 (1978). 
 105. Lacy v. Fid. Bank of Durham, 183 N.C. 373, 380, 111 S.E. 612, 615 (1922) (“[T]he 
[state constitution] should be considered as a whole and construed so as to allow 
significance to each and every part of it if this can be done by any fair and reasonable 
intendment.”); Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 137 N.C. 310, 312, 49 S.E. 353, 354 (1904) 
(“It is [the court’s] duty to reconcile [conflicting portions of the state constitution], so that, 
if possible, both be given force and effect.”). 
 106. LexisNexis Risk Data Mgmt., Inc. v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 368 N.C. 
180, 187, 775 S.E.2d 651, 656 (2015). General provisions are those that lay out broad 
principles or rules in an area, while specific provisions tackle a more precise principle, 
rule, or issue within that area. See id. LexisNexis Risk Data Management, Inc. provides an 
instructive example. It considered a conflict between the “general” Public Records Act—
which lays out broad rules for access to public records—with a “more specific statute” that 
governs “‘remote electronic access’ to court records.” Id. at 181, 775 S.E.2d at 652. 
 107. See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 408, 562 S.E.2d 377, 413 (2002) (Parker, 
J., dissenting) (describing the “rule of statutory construction” that provisions should be 
reconciled with each other as “equally applicable to constitutional construction”); Baker, 
330 N.C. at 337, 410 S.E.2d at 890–91 (noting that “many tools of statutory construction 
are appropriate for and consistent with constitutional interpretation” while pointing out 
that the statutory construction doctrine of expression unius est exclusio alterius had not 
been used in constitutional interpretation); see also Stephenson, 355 N.C. at 370, 562 
S.E.2d at 389 (“Issues concerning the proper construction of the Constitution of North 
Carolina ‘are in the main governed by the same general principles which control in 
ascertaining the meaning of all written instruments.’” (quoting State ex rel. Martin v. 
Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 449, 385 S.E.2d 437, 478 (1989))). 
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Strongly enforcing section 24 also follows the general practice of 
giving precedence to a subsequent, specific provision when it conflicts 
with an older, more general one. As the court notes in Town of 
Boone, the power described in article VII, section 1 has long belonged 
to the General Assembly; the provision is “a general description” of 
relatively broad authority the General Assembly has always 
possessed.108 In this way it broadly describes the General Assembly’s 
authority over all local governments on all matters. Section 24, by 
contrast, has its constitutional origins in 1917 and prohibits laws 
within the scope of its fourteen specific, enumerated provisions unless 
applied statewide. Since section 24 is a subsequent, specific provision, 
general principles of construction suggest that it should be applied to 
the enumerated situations despite the broad authority granted by 
article VII, section 1, which was adopted earlier and is more general 
in nature.109 
Finally, though the Town of Boone court seems to draw a sharp 
distinction between the General Assembly’s apparently unlimited 
authority for the “fixing of boundaries” of local governments and 
“provid[ing] for [their] organization and government” mentioned in 
the first clause of article VII, section 1 and its limited authority to 
assign “powers and duties” in the same provision’s second clause,110 it 
is unclear that such a distinction exists in the real world. As noted 
above, by fixing the boundaries of local government, the General 
Assembly is necessarily assigning “powers and duties” to different 
governments. For example, by setting the boundaries of a town, the 
 
 108. Town of Boone v. State, 369 N.C. 126, 131–32, 794 S.E.2d 710, 715 (2016) (“[T]his 
broad power of the General Assembly [over local governments] has remained unchanged 
throughout our history.” (quoting N.C. STATE CONSTITUTION STUDY COMM’N, supra 
note 18, at 85)). 
 109. Some may take issue with principles of construction that this Recent 
Development argues should be controlling. As one famous law review article observed, 
many different canons of construction can be used to reach many different “correct” 
outcomes. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 
(1950). This view is certainly an understandable one, but the principles argued for here 
make the most sense because they best conform with the idea in law and in life that words 
derive their meaning from the context around them. See, e.g., Dunn v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins., 
332 N.C. 129, 134, 418 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1992) (“Ordinary rules of grammar apply when 
ascertaining the meaning of a statute, and the meaning must be construed according to the 
context and approved usage of the language.”); Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 
N.C. 520, 524, 259 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1979) (“[W]ords and phrases . . . must be interpreted 
contextually, in a manner which harmonizes [them] with . . . other provisions . . . and which 
gives effect to the reason and purpose of the statute.”). 
 110. See Town of Boone, 369 N.C. at 134–35, 794 S.E.2d at 716–17. 
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General Assembly is necessarily giving a town the duty to enforce 
building codes and the power to levy taxes inside those boundaries.111 
B. Why the Boone Act Fails a Careful Section 24(1)(a) Analysis 
Since section 24 should apply to the Boone Act and all other 
constitutional challenges involving local acts, the next step in the 
analysis is to apply the City of Asheville framework. This requires 
asking whether, in light of its stated purpose and practical effect, the 
Boone Act has a material connection to health, sanitation, and the 
abatement of nuisances. Given the purpose behind and practical 
effect of the Boone Act combined with the historical purpose of ETJ 
in general, the answer to this question must be yes. 
1.  The Boone Act was Designed to End Health Regulations Imposed 
by the Town of Boone 
The Boone Act withdrew Boone’s authority to exercise ETJ 
authority within one mile of its corporate limits.112 ETJ authority 
allows a municipality to assert an array of powers outside its 
corporate limits, including zoning regulations, “housing and building 
codes and regulations on historic districts and historic landmarks, 
open spaces, community development, erosion and sedimentation 
control, floodways, mountain ridges, and roadway corridors.”113 
Despite the range of powers available to it, Boone primarily 
exercised its ETJ authority to limit development on steep slopes that 
surround the valley in which it is situated. Senator Dan Soucek, who 
sponsored the Boone Act, seemed to recognize this when he crafted 
his bill.114 His primary goal in passing the Boone Act was to change 
the arrangement so that Watauga County, and not the Town of 
Boone, was in charge of enforcing building regulations in the ETJ 
 
 111. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-206(a) (2017) (“A city shall have power to impose 
taxes only as specifically authorized by act of the General Assembly.”); id. § 160A-412 
(giving all cities the authority to enforce the state building code). 
 112. Act of June 26, 2014, ch. 33, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 139, 139–40; Town of Boone, 
369 N.C. at 127–28, 794 S.E.2d at 712. 
 113. OWENS, supra note 71, at 31. Though the focus of the analysis here is Boone’s 
specific use of ETJ authority, the ETJ powers least related to health (like designating 
historic districts) are also those least used by North Carolina municipalities exercising ETJ 
authority. See OWENS, supra note 85, at 11 tbl.7. 
 114. See Matthew Burns, Boone Zoning Dispute First Case Heard by Three-Judge 
Panel, WRAL: @NCCAPITOL (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.wral.com/boone-zoning-dispute-
first-case-heard-by-three-judge-panel/14281318/ [https://perma.cc/KUB9-74YE]. 
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area.115 Since Watauga County has very limited zoning regulations, 
this could open up the ETJ area to development.116 
City of New Bern v. New Bern-Craven County Board of 
Education117—the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s most recent 
section 24(1)(a) case before City of Asheville and Town of Boone—
speaks directly to the General Assembly’s authority to pass a local act 
reassigning the power to enforce local building regulations from one 
local government to another. In that case, the court unanimously 
invalidated a local act which shifted the enforcement of building 
regulations from a city to a county as an impermissible health 
regulation under section 24.118 The court reasoned that because the 
regulations included provisions on plumbing and fire safety, they 
were designed to protect the “health of those who use the 
buildings.”119 The situation in Town of Boone is nearly identical to 
that in City of New Bern, since the Boone Act’s primary sponsor and 
proponent sought to shift the responsibility for enforcing building 
regulations in the ETJ area from Boone to Watauga County. 
The analogy between Town of Boone and City of New Bern is 
strengthened by the fact that politically controversial steep slope 
regulations—the building regulations that the Boone Act’s sponsor 
seemed to take the most issue with—were explicitly designed to 
address health-related concerns.120 The material connection between 
the Boone Act and health and sanitation matters is further supported 
by the town’s extension of water service to areas within the ETJ while 
not extending such service to “unregulated growth areas,” i.e., areas 
outside the town’s boundaries and outside the ETJ area.121 The court 
 
 115. See id.; Laura Leslie, House Resurrects, Passes Boone ETJ Bill, WRAL: 
@NCCAPITOL (June 24, 2014), http://www.wral.com/house-resurrects-boone-etj-bill-/137
61065/ [https://perma.cc/28SX-R22R]. 
 116. See Burns, supra note 114; Leslie, supra note 115. 
 117. 338 N.C. 430, 450 S.E.2d 735 (1994). 
 118. Id. at 440, 444, 450 S.E.2d at 741, 743. 
 119. Id. at 440, 450 S.E.2d at 741. 
 120. See TOWN OF BOONE, STEEP SLOPE: HOW REGULATIONS AFFECT PROPERTY 
OWNERS 1, http://www.townofboone.net/wp-content/uploads/documents/departments/
development/pdfs/TOB_Steep_Slope_Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/585V-4MM4] (noting 
that “steep slope/viewshed regulations” were adopted by Boone for safety reasons). City 
of New Bern tells us that building regulations designed to protect safety are health 
regulations for section 24 purposes. See City of New Bern, 338 N.C. at 440, 450 S.E.2d at 
741. Even if the court reversed the position it took in City of New Bern—that building 
safety regulations are health regulations—the Boone Act would still be unconstitutional 
on nuisance grounds. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 121. Jesse Wood, Boone’s ETJ To Be Abolished Jan. 1, 2015 After Bill Passes House in 
a 66 to 46 Vote Wednesday, HIGH COUNTRY PRESS (June 25, 2014, 4:56 PM), 
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has repeatedly held that water and sewer regulations are related to 
health and sanitation.122 The specific ways Boone exercised its ETJ 
authority also line up with a historical recognition of the ETJ (and to 
some degree zoning more broadly) as a health regulation.123 
2.  The Powers of ETJ Not Related to Health are Related to the 
Abatement of Nuisances 
Even though many of the powers associated with ETJ authority 
are related to health and sanitation, not all of them are. Though none 
of the three opinions in Town of Boone directly focus on connections 
between ETJ authority and nuisances, there is a strong case to be 
made that those ETJ powers that do not relate to health and 
sanitation do relate to the abatement of nuisances.124  
The legal definition of the word “nuisance” is quite broad. For 
example, Black’s Law Dictionary describes a nuisance as any 
“condition, activity, or situation . . . that interferes with the use or 
enjoyment of property.”125 A leading treatise written just before the 
adoption of section 24 takes a similarly broad view,126 as have North 




 122. See Lamb v. Bd. of Educ. of Randolph Cty., 235 N.C. 377, 379, 70 S.E.2d 201, 203 
(1952) (invalidating a local act directing the Randolph County Board of Education to 
provide adequate water services); Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N.C. 722, 726–27, 143 S.E. 
530, 532–33 (1928) (invalidating a local act expanding the authority of a Henderson 
County sanitary district to allow it to provide both water and sewer service). 
 123. See MUN. GOV’T STUDY COMM’N, N.C. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE 
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY 18 (1958) (noting that granting cities ETJ authority is appropriate because 
“[h]ealth and safety problems arising outside the city do not always respect city limits as 
they spread”); Amanda Erickson, A Brief History of the Birth of Urban Planning, 
CITYLAB (Aug. 24, 2012), https://www.citylab.com/life/2012/08/brief-history-birth-urban-
planning/2365/ [https://perma.cc/BE3M-A6FF] (describing the important role public 
health officials played in early American urban planning). 
 124. The strong historical connection between ETJ authority, health policy, and 
Boone’s specific use of ETJ authority to regulate what the court has considered health 
matters establishes a “material connection” between the Boone Act and health and 
sanitation matters, which is all that is required for the law to be declared unconstitutional 
under the City of Asheville standard. See City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 103, 794 
S.E.2d 759, 776 (2016). The connections between the abatement of nuisances and ETJ 
authority are examined here to bolster this argument and suggest that the court failed to 
explore the connection between the Boone Act and one of the three prohibited subjects in 
article II, section 24(1)(a). 
 125. Nuisance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 126. JOSEPH A. JOYCE & HOWARD C. JOYCE, TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING 
NUISANCES 2 (1906) (defining a nuisance as “anything that works or causes injury, 
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If a nuisance is defined this broadly, then “regulations on historic 
districts and historic landmarks, open spaces, community 
development, erosion and sedimentation control, floodways, 
mountain ridges, and roadway corridors”128—those ETJ powers not 
related to health and sanitation—should be interpreted as abating 
nuisances, since these regulations are intended to aid property owners 
in enjoying their property and enhancing the value of that property.129 
In addition to protecting health and safety, Boone’s steep slope 
regulations—which, again, caused much of the uproar that led 
Senator Soucek to introduce the Boone Act—were explicitly 
designed to address concerns that would fall inside this broad 
definition of nuisances.130 
In sum, many ETJ regulations have a material relationship to 
health and sanitation. Those ETJ regulations that do not have a 
material connection to health and sanitation, furthermore, often do 
have such a material connection to the abatement of nuisances, given 
the broad legal definition of that term. The close connection between 
ETJ regulation and the regulation of health, sanitation, and nuisances 
is further evidenced by the specific ways Boone used its ETJ authority 
before the General Assembly withdrew it through the Boone Act. 
Finally, these conclusions are bolstered by historical connections the 
General Assembly and Supreme Court of North Carolina have drawn 
between health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances and the 
exercise of ETJ authority.131 
 
damage, hurt, inconvenience, annoyance, or discomfort to one in the enjoyment of his 
legitimate and reasonable rights of person or property”). 
 127. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-174(a) (2017) (giving local governments the power to 
“define and abate nuisances”); see also 22 THOMAS SMITH, STRONG’S NORTH CAROLINA 
INDEX, Nuisance § 1 (4th ed. 2015) (collecting cases defining “nuisance” for purposes of 
tort recovery). In its sole section 24 case decided on nuisance grounds, the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina struck down a law allowing the killing of cattle lawfully grazing on 
private land on the Outer Banks because they were reducing the growth of plant life there, 
suggesting a broad interpretation of what constitutes a nuisance. Chadwick v. Salter, 254 
N.C. 389, 391–92, 398, 119 S.E.2d 158, 160, 164–65 (1961); see also infra note 131 and 
accompanying text. 
 128. OWENS, supra note 71, at 31. 
 129. See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text. 
 130. See TOWN OF BOONE, supra note 120, at 1 (noting that “steep slope/viewshed 
regulations” were adopted in part to further “[t]he protection of the scenic beauty and 
natural environment of Boone’s hillside areas vital to preservation of the character of 
[Boone’s] community and continued economic development”). 
 131. See David W. Owens, Can a City Really Zone Land Outside the City?, COATES’ 
CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (Apr. 12, 2011), https://canons.sog.unc.edu/can-a-city-really-
zone-land-outside-the-city/ [https://perma.cc/DU36-ACQE] (“For many years states have 
authorized municipal regulation of extraterritorial areas to protect public health and 
safety . . . . The North Carolina supreme court [sic] in 1912 upheld a law giving Greensboro 
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All of these facts work to establish a material connection 
between the purpose and effect of the Boone Act and the section 24 
subjects of health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances. Since 
this law was a local act relating to subjects prohibited by section 24, 
the court should have held the Boone Act unconstitutional. 
IV.  A POTENTIAL SOLUTION TO THE DECADES-LONG STRUGGLE 
WITH SECTION 24(1)(A) DOCTRINE 
As one commentator has pointed out, the conflicting results in 
these two cases have created a local-state relations dynamic that is 
“far from clear.”132 This lack of clarity, though, is nothing new. The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has been far from consistent in the 
reasoning it applies to article II, section 24(1)(a) cases. By resolving 
challenges to laws under section 24(1)(a) in two markedly different 
ways on the same day in City of Asheville and Town of Boone, the 
court simply highlighted what has been a consistent problem for 
decades. The court should resolve this problem by reaffirming—with 
a slight modification—the standard it articulated in City of Asheville. 
A. The Court Should Reaffirm the Standard Articulated in City of 
Asheville (with a Slight Modification) 
Though completely new, the standard adopted by the City of 
Asheville court makes a good deal of sense. First, it takes into account 
factors that the court has considered in past 24(1)(a) cases—namely, 
a focus on the purpose of the law and the intent of the General 
Assembly in adopting it. Second, it is relatively straightforward to 
apply. Third, it lines up well with principles of constitutional 
construction, especially those that emphasize reading the entire 
constitution together. Finally, it allows for some difference of opinion 
for what does and does not qualify as a health regulation, as 
demonstrated by Justice Ervin’s concurrence and Justice Beasley’s 
dissent in Town of Boone. 
 The issue, though, becomes the sweeping breadth of laws which 
would have a material connection to prohibited subjects under this 
 
authority to impose sanitary regulations in the area one mile beyond the city limits. The 
legislature in 1917 gave all cities the authority to adopt similar health and safety 
regulations for areas within a mile of the city limits, an authority that is found today in 
G.S. 160A-193.” (citation omitted)). Today, the title of section 160A-193 of the General 
Statutes of North Carolina is “Abatement of public health nuisances.” Though Boone 
exercised its ETJ authority pursuant to a different statute, section 160A-360 of the 
General Statutes of North Carolina, the point remains. 
 132. See Bluestein, supra note 27. 
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standard and may thus be unconstitutional. As the analysis in Part III, 
demonstrates, an array of regulations like the exercise of ETJ 
authority are clearly “related to health, sanitation, and abatement of 
nuisances” that either were historically regulated by the General 
Assembly through local acts or have other important purposes 
besides the prohibited subjects.133 Article II, section 24, then, has 
been overlooked, at least to some degree, by both the General 
Assembly and the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Strongly 
enforcing the provision now could threaten the system of shared 
local-state authority that both the General Assembly and 
municipalities have relied on for decades. 
Thus, the court should affirm the standard it articulated in City of 
Asheville—namely, “whether, in light of its stated purpose and 
practical effect, the legislation has a material . . . connection to issues 
involving health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances.”134 To 
remedy the problem of breadth, the court should add a second part to 
its City of Asheville test. It should ask whether the General Assembly 
historically regulated the subject at issue135 through local acts since 
article II, section 24 was added to the state constitution in 1917. If the 
subject was historically regulated, then the local act should be held 
constitutional. If the area was not historically regulated by the 
General Assembly through local acts, then the local act should be 
declared unconstitutional. Of course, this test does not affect the 
General Assembly’s article VII, section 1 authority to pass any local 
act not materially related to one of the fourteen prohibited subjects in 
article II, section 24. 
Had the City of Asheville court used this test, the result would be 
the same. As the court’s opinion demonstrates, there was clearly a 
material connection between the Asheville Act and health, sanitation, 
 
 133. ETJ authority is an excellent example of a subject traditionally regulated by the 
General Assembly through local acts. Since 1973, the General Assembly has altered the 
ETJ authority of a municipality through a local act at least sixty-one times. See OWENS, 
supra note 85, at 7 n.42. Certain building code provisions are another example. See 
OWENS, supra note 71, at 55–56 n.10 (describing at least nine instances of cities getting the 
authority to enforce sprinkler requirements in buildings through local acts of the General 
Assembly). 
 134. City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 103, 794 S.E.2d 759, 776 (2016). As the 
language in City of Asheville suggests, “material” roughly means significant but does not 
require that the connection between the challenged law and the prohibited subject be 
“exclusive or predominant.” See id. 
 135. “Subject” in this context means the narrow topic of the legislation. Obviously, 
section 24 lists broad subjects on which local acts are prohibited. Subject in this context, 
therefore, is meant to reference specific subjects like water and sanitation, extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, etc. 
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and abatement of nuisances.136 That, combined with a lack of 
regulation of local water and sewer services by the General Assembly 
through local acts,137 would render the law unconstitutional under the 
test proposed here. Had the Town of Boone court used this test in 
evaluating the Boone Act, in contrast, the result would have been 
different. Though the Boone Act has a material connection to health, 
sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances,138 ETJ authority was 
historically regulated by the General Assembly through local acts.139 
Under the proposed new test, it would thus pass constitutional 
muster. 
B. A Modified City of Asheville Standard Provides Needed 
Certainty 
Generally, consistent judicial standards have a number of 
important benefits, including increased predictability for legislators 
and potential litigants as well as the promise of equal treatment for 
these parties, regardless of the particular parties involved in a given 
case.140 This seems especially true for constitutional cases, where a 
lack of doctrinal clarity can fuel cynicism about the judicial process 
and lead the public to believe that judges are simply “politicians in 
robes,” deciding cases on the basis of their own political views instead 
of established legal principles.141 The consistent section 24(1)(a) 
standard proposed here would bring these benefits to fruition while 
staying true to section 24(1)(a)’s original purpose by limiting the 
number of local acts under consideration by the General Assembly. 
Perhaps most importantly, this formulation gives local 
governments more certainty that the local acts they have relied upon 
as good authority for years will not be subject to constitutional 
 
 136. City of Asheville, 369 N.C. at 104–05, 794 S.E.2d at 776–77. 
 137. The court struck down a local law relating to water and sewer services as early as 
1928, Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N.C. 722, 727, 143 S.E. 530, 532–33 (1928), so it follows 
that there has been no tradition of regulating water and sewer through local acts since 
local governments could not rely in good faith on such grants of authority. 
 138. See supra Part III.B. 
 139. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 140. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1178 (1989). 
 141. Perhaps the best recent example of this is Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2608 (2015), where the United States Supreme Court found a constitutional right to gay 
marriage. Even many supporters of the decision’s outcome questioned the reasoning used 
to reach the result. See, e.g., Scott E. Isaacson, Obergefell v Hodges: The US Supreme 
Court Decides the Marriage Question, 4 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 530, 535 (2015) (“For 
many, it is difficult to resist the cynical conclusion: that the five majority justices decided 
as they did because they simply thought it was the right thing to do, even though the 
Constitution provides little support for such a decision.”). 
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challenges. As it stands now, the only reason that many of these local 
acts remain in force is that no one has challenged them. In short, this 
approach protects the status quo in areas where the state and local 
governments have traditionally found that regulation through local 
acts works.142 Though preserving the status quo might have both 
positive and negative implications for municipalities, it makes sense 
as a goal in this context because the court is not the proper forum for 
a complete redefinition of the structure of local-state relations. Such 
large-scale changes should come from the General Assembly or 
through a constitutional amendment. 
C. North Carolina’s Current Framework for Local-State Relations 
Should Be Further Studied and Potentially Modified 
Clearly, the test proposed here is not a panacea. It would not, for 
example, allow the General Assembly to pilot a new regulation 
through local acts materially related to one of the prohibited subjects, 
and it could prevent the legislature from giving a local government 
special authority to solve a unique problem it faces. 
As noted above, the purpose of article II, section 24 has largely 
been achieved, as there are far fewer local bills in the General 
Assembly than there were in the early twentieth century. The 
problem now primarily seems to be that many local bills are far more 
politically controversial than in the past.143 Section 24 was not 
 
 142. The concern about upsetting the status quo was raised by Justice Newby in his 
dissent in City of Asheville. City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 106, 794 S.E.2d 759, 778 
(2016) (Newby, J., dissenting). Though the majority seems to adequately address this 
concern, see id. at 106 n.20, 794 S.E.2d at 778 n.20 (majority opinion), the approach to 
section 24 proposed here would go further in ensuring the safety of the status quo from 
constitutional challenge. 
 143. See, e.g., Joe Killian, Republican-Controlled Legislature Looks to Flex Political 
Muscle at the Local Level Once Again, N.C. POL’Y WATCH (May 4, 2017), 
http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2017/05/04/republican-controlled-legislature-looks-flex-political-
muscle-local-level/ [https://perma.cc/E96Y-QLYM]. This increase in partisanship of local 
issues is part of a national trend. See Katherine Levine Einstein & David M. Glick, Cities 
in American Federalism: Evidence on State–Local Government Conflict from a Survey of 
Mayors, 47 PUBLIUS 599, 600 (2017); Emily Badger, Blue Cities Want to Make Their Own 
Rules. Red States Won’t Let Them., N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (July 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/upshot/blue-cities-want-to-make-their-own-rules-red-
states-wont-let-them.html [https://perma.cc/SU7B-L5NF].  
Examples of recent politically controversial North Carolina laws involving conflicts 
between local and state authority are numerous. See, e.g., Act of March 23, 2016, ch. 3, sec. 
1.1, § 115C-47, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 12, 12 (regulating bathroom use by transgender 
individuals and making various employment law changes), repealed by Act of March 30, 
2017, ch. 4, § 1, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 16, 16 (2017); Act of July 2, 2015, ch. 138, § 2(c), 2015 
N.C. Sess. Laws 338, 338 (altering how city council elections are conducted in 
Greensboro), invalidated by City of Greensboro v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 251 F. 
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designed to deal with this issue. The General Assembly, then, should 
study the scheme of local-state relations laid out in the North 
Carolina Constitution to see if the current framework for such 
relations should be modified to respond to contemporary problems. 
CONCLUSION 
City of Asheville v. State and Town of Boone v. State highlight the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decades-long struggle to 
articulate a workable standard governing article II, section 24(1)(a) 
cases. These two cases add to the confusion in this area and, as one 
commentator noted, leave the General Assembly and local 
governments with guidance that is far from clear. This lack of clarity 
is especially problematic as local legislation becomes increasingly 
partisan and more frequently litigated. 
Though the General Assembly or some other body it designates 
should study local-state relations in depth to see if constitutional 
changes are necessary to ensure a more stable framework going 
forward, the new test announced in City of Asheville could help bring 
more clarity to this little-understood area of the court’s jurisprudence 
in the meantime. By adding an additional prong to the test that 
excludes subjects historically regulated by the General Assembly 
through local acts from being struck down as unconstitutional, the 
court preserves the status quo in areas where the state and local 
governments traditionally found that this type of regulation works. 
Such an approach provides local governments with more certainty 
that the local acts on which they have long relied for authority to act 
are safe from constitutional challenge while giving full effect to two 
seemingly contradictory provisions of the state constitution. 
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